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DOES SEMANTIC DEFLATIONISM ENTAIL
META-ONTOLOGICAL DEFLATIONISM?
By Benjamin Marschall1 and Thomas Schindler2
Deflationary positions have been defended in many areas of philosophy. Most prominent are semantic
deflationism about truth and reference, and meta-ontological deflationism, according to which existence
has no deep nature and the standard neo-Quinean approach to ontology is misguided. Although both
kinds of views have generated much discussion, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question
of how they relate to each other. Are they independent, is it advisable to hold them all at once, or do they
even entail each other? One exception is Amie Thomasson, who has argued that semantic deflationism
actually entails meta-ontological deflationism. This is unexpected, since semantic deflationism is usually
regarded as much less controversial than meta-ontological deflationism. In our paper, we will argue
that Thomasson’s argument fails though, and that the connection between the views is in fact weaker
than she makes them out to be.
Keywords: SemanticDeflationism,Meta-OntologicalDeflationism,EasyOntology,
Thomasson, Horwich, Neo-Quineanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Semantic deflationism about truth and reference has been on the philosophical
map for a while and has found many adherents. More recently, a number of
deflationary accounts have been proposed in meta-ontology as well (Hirsch
2002; Schiffer 2003; Rayo 2013; Thomasson 2015; Hofweber 2016; Linnebo
2018). Given how frequently the notions of truth and reference are invoked
in meta-ontological debates, one may wonder if there is a deeper connection
between these deflationisms. Are they independent, is it advisable to hold them
all at once, or do they even entail each other?
Amie Thomasson has recently defended a strong entailment thesis: accord-
ing to her, semantic deflationism about truth and reference (which is popular)
entails meta-ontological deflationism (which is controversial), where she de-
fines meta-ontological deflationism to be the view that (a) existence has no
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deep nature and that (b) the widely-held neo-Quinean approach to ontology
is misguided (Thomasson 2014). This is a surprising thesis, and would have
numerous repercussions if true. (Note that a number of leading truth deflation-
ists, such as Horwich and Field, have embraced core tenets of Quine. Indeed,
Quine himself—one of the fathers of truth deflationism—is a Quinean.) We
will argue, however, that her argument fails, and that there is in fact no entail-
ment of this kind.
II. THREE KINDS OF DEFLATIONISM
This paper focuses on three kinds of deflationism: (i) semantic deflationism
about truth and reference, (ii) existence deflationism, and (iii) meta-ontological
deflationism. Thomasson argues that (i) entails (ii) and that (ii) entails (iii), and
in the following we will criticise both steps. That (ii) is not subsumed under (iii)
may seem initially puzzling. However, as we will see in a moment, existence
deflationism is a thesis about the property existence, whereas meta-ontological
deflationism is a thesis about how (not) to resolve ontological debates (i.e.,
questions about what kinds of things exist).
II.1. Semantic and existence deflationism
According to semantic deflationism, the properties of truth and reference have
no deep nature which can be analysed informatively, and all that can be said
about truth and reference is captured by relatively trivial platitudes. Here is
how Paul Horwich formulates the view:
Truth Deflationism
The meaning of ‘true’ is captured by the trivial equivalence schema: 〈p〉 is true iff p (see
Horwich 1998: 103)
Reference Deflationism
The meaning of ‘refer’ is captured by the trivial equivalence schema: (∀x) tokens of 〈n〉
refer to x iff n = x (see Horwich 1998: 119)
According to semantic deflationism, the notions of truth and reference are
mere logico-linguistic tools. For example, the truth predicate enables us to ex-
press certain generalisations that would otherwise be very hard or impossible
to formulate—i.e., it allows us to say things like ‘Everything that Jamie says
about food is true’, without having to assert every single statement that Jamie
has made about food. Similarly, the notion of reference allows us to articulate
de re attributions of content (Horwich 1998: 121–3). For our purposes, the most
important consequence of semantic deflationism is the following: there is no
analysis or reduction of truth and reference, for instance in terms of correspon-
dence to facts (in the case of truth), or causal relations (in the case of reference).
Consequently, there can be no informative biconditional of the form ‘x refers
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to y iff x stands in relation R to y’ in order to explain reference, and the same
holds for truth (Thomasson 2014: 185).
The thesis of existence deflationism is analogous to semantic deflationism, al-
though less familiar. Thomasson discusses this position in (2008) (although not
under this label), and has recently described it as follows:
On the deflationary view, existence is simply not a property or activity the deeper
nature of which one could hope to uncover with a philosophical theory. As a result, all
substantive theories of existence, whether they identify existing with having (distinctive)
causal powers, being mind-independent, being physical, observable, or trackable, would
alike be rejected as wrong-headed, much as the semantic deflationist rejects all of the
diverse proposals about what the property of truth or the relation of reference really
consists in. (Thomasson 2014: 192)
On other occasions, Thomasson also describes the existence deflationist as
denying that there is ‘some substantive across-the-board criterion for existence’
(Thomasson 2014: 196). So we can sum up the position thus:
Existence Deflationism
The property existence does not have a deep nature, and there is no substantive criterion
of existence.1
If ‘exists’ does not pick out a property the nature of which may be investi-
gated, why do we have such a term in our language? According to Thomasson,
the concept of (non)existence enables us to call attention to certain kinds of
mistakes a listener might be making—e.g. ‘we might comfort a child by telling
her that monsters don’t exist—they are just talked about in stories and movies’
(Thomasson 2014: 199). In other words, it enables us to express that ‘monsters’
doesn’t refer, without using the concept of reference—i.e., while remaining in
the object language.2
II.2. Meta-ontological deflationism
Following Thomasson, we will construe meta-ontological deflationism as a
negative thesis: namely, as the view that ‘something is wrong with many ontolog-
ical debates’ (Thomasson 2014: 205). More specifically, Thomasson identifies
two problems with mainstream ontology: (1) Some debates invoke the nature
of existence to argue for or against certain entities, and (2) many debates
1 Thomasson actually seems to go further and suggests that existence is not a property at
all. We think that it is preferable to construe existence as a lightweight property that is trivially
instantiated by all existing objects though, for it makes existence deflationism more closely
analogous to semantic deflationism. Nothing essential in this paper will depend on this choice.
2 Onemight worry that there is something circular about explaining non-existence in terms of
reference failure, given that reference failure seems to require an understanding of non-existence.
For discussion see Thomasson 2014: section VII and Burgess 2015.
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rely on a neo-Quinean approach to answer existence questions (Thomasson
2014: 202).3
According to neo-Quineans, we come to find out what exists by looking at
what the best overall theory of the world is ontologically committed to. This
characterisation raises two questions: what is the best theory of the world, and
what are the ontological commitments of theories? Concerning the second
point, Quine’s influential criterion of ontological commitment requires us first
to regiment our theory in a first-order language. Then we can say that a theory
is committed to those entities its quantifiers need to range over for it to be true.
In other words, a theory is committed to the existence of Fs if and only if it
entails the sentence ∃x Fx. The first question is less straightforward, however.
Quine himself endorsed a strong form of naturalism according to which physics
is the arbiter of what is real. Contemporary neo-Quineans usually understand
‘best theory’ more broadly, and take our best overall theory of the world to
also include other sciences and various metaphysical theories.
Quine and the neo-Quineans compare competing theories in terms of their
goodness. For this they rely on theoretical virtues such as simplicity, and there-
fore parsimonious theories with fewer ontological commitments tend to be
preferred over more ontologically extravagant theories. Some neo-Quineans
will reject the existence of tables, for instance, as they think that our best theory
of the world only needs to quantify over fundamental particles.
Meta-ontological deflationists reject the neo-Quinean methodology. Note
that their target is usually not Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment,
which, on the contrary, they often endorse. What is distinctive about meta-
ontological deflationism is rather its denial that we need to engage in an
elaborate process of theory construction and comparison in order to answer
ontological questions. In this sense deflationism is a theory-light approach, as
deflationists typically use natural language—or a slightly regimented version
of it—as a guide to ontology (see Schiffer 2003; Thomasson 2015; Hofweber
2016). As a consequence, deflationists usually embrace a more promiscuous
ontology than neo-Quineans.
It is instructive to consider a particular proposal in some detail. According to
Thomasson’s easy approach to ontology, ‘we can answer [...] existence questions
by way of simple observations or via trivial inferences from uncontroversial
truths (which, given the constitutive rules governing [... a] concept, may guar-
antee that the concept refers and that things of that kind exist)’ (Thomasson
2014: 205f). And it turns out that according to this methodology, most ontologi-
cal questionswhich have generated a lot of debate are answered affirmatively—
i.e., easy ontology tends to rule in favour of the entities in question.
3 Why should this view be called meta-ontological instead of just ontological deflationism?
Thomasson’s motivation for this choice is that ontological deflationism suggests that certain
entities are ‘reduced in ontological standing’ (Thomasson 2015: 145), which is a claim she rejects.
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Consider the long-standing dispute aboutwhether, in addition to simple par-
ticles, there are also composites composed by the particles. Thomasson thinks
that in order to answer this question, we don’t need to compare metaphysical
theories with regard to theoretical virtues, in order to then see whether the
best theory quantifies over composites. Rather, according to her the question
can be answered by relying only on relatively simple conceptual and empirical
considerations, since she takes the following principle to be a conceptual truth
governing the meaning of ‘table’:
(T) If there are particles arranged table-wise then there is a table.
Since the existence of particles arranged table-wise seems to be an uncon-
troversial empirical truth, we can conclude from (T) that there are tables—and,
therefore, that composites exist. Ontology thus becomes easy in the sense that
we can eschew metaphysical theory construction and comparison in favour
of more tractable conceptual and empirical investigations (Thomasson 2007,
2009, 2015).
II.3. Connections
Semantic deflationism and existence deflationismmake claims about the prop-
erties truth, reference, and existence. Meta-ontological deflationism is a negative
thesis about how not to approach ontological questions, which can be com-
bined with different positive methodologies instead. Given these three kinds
of deflationism, a series of questions arise: What is the relation between the
different theses? Are they independent, or does one kind of deflationism entail
another? Is it a good idea to embrace all of them together?
There is good reason to think that combining these deflationisms is bene-
ficial. One popular move among defenders of surprising metaphysical theses,
such as that there are no tables, is to argue that the world doesn’t contain any
truthmakers that would make claims about tables true. But deflationists about
truth and reference usually reject the demand for truthmakers. Thomasson
explains this as follows:
Semanticminimalism encourages us to give up the representationalist picture [according
to which true statements ‘match’ features of the world]. For if the notion of truth is simply
captured in the equivalence schema, then there is no pressure to look for what states of
affairs correspond to our true claims, what facts make them true, or what objects they
are about in order to explain what makes them true. (Thomasson 2014: 203)4
If this is correct, then taking semantic deflationism on board makes things
easier for a meta-ontological deflationist who accepts the existence of many
kinds of entities, such as material objects, numbers, and so on. Arguments
4 For more on representationalism see Price 2011: chapter 1.
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against these entities based on truthmakers can then swiftly be rejected as
resting on a mistaken view of the nature of truth and reference. In this sense
semantic deflationism can be said to support (at least some versions of) meta-
ontological deflationism.
Thomasson, however, has recently argued for a much stronger claim.
According to her, semantic deflationism actually entails existence deflation-
ism, and existence deflationism in turn entails meta-ontological deflationism:
[...] although [...] semantic deflationism has been far more popular than [existence]
deflationism, it becomes clear that it is not merely odd but inconsistent to accept the first
without accepting the second. (Thomasson 2014: 206, emphasis ours)
This also leaves us with a form of meta-ontological deflationism, holding that something
is wrong with the vast majority of recent debates about what exists [...]. This is a radical
conclusion indeed that [...] follows from the widely familiar and accepted deflationisms
about truth [...] (Thomasson 2014: 202f, emphasis ours)
This would be a very exciting result. After all, while semantic deflation-
ism is a reasonably popular position, meta-ontological deflationism is usually
regarded as a minority view, which, unlike the neo-Quinean orthodoxy, is
in need of substantial arguments. Moreover, as we pointed out earlier, many
contemporary semantic deflationists have explicitly endorsed core tenets of
neo-Quineanism. If Thomasson is correct, these philosophers have adopted
an inconsistent position.
In the following we will argue, however, that Thomasson’s argument doesn’t
work: Neither does semantic deflationism entail existence deflationism, nor
does existence deflationism entailmeta-ontological deflationism. Furthermore,
we discuss a third argument according to which the combination of existence
deflationism with a use theory of meaning entails easy ontology, and argue
that it is a misleading way of presenting the relationship between these views.
One can distinguish two different kinds of arguments Thomasson puts
forward. The first kind is supposed to show that semantic deflationism logically
entails existence deflationism, which in turn logically entails meta-ontological
deflationism. Against this we will argue that there is no entailment of this
kind, which is significant as the quotes above suggest that Thomasson wants
to establish this strong claim.
Some of her arguments have a different structure, however. In one of her
arguments from truth to existence deflationism, for instance, she relies on
additional premises that are clearly independent of truth deflationism. Even
if successful, this argument could thus not establish that truth deflationism as
such logically entails existence deflationism.
Our conjecture is that Thomasson has a looser sense of entailment and
inconsistency in mind. Arguably there are some philosophical positions which
are not logically inconsistent, but it is nevertheless hard to see how they could
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be fruitfully combined. Suppose you think that we can give a semantics for
modal discourse without any reference to Lewis’s concrete possible worlds, but
still think that these worlds exist—they just don’t do the theoretical work Lewis
had in mind. This combination is coherent but, pending some background
story, has little plausibility.
Some of Thomasson’s remarks suggest that she has something analogous
in mind: if one accepts semantic deflationism, then all good reasons to reject
meta-ontological deflationism fall away. We argue, however, that Thomasson
also fails to show that this looser sense of entailment obtains.
In order to properly evaluate Thomasson’s arguments, one needs to keep the
dialectical situation inmind. Thomasson’s goal is to show that the controversial
thesis ofmeta-ontological deflationism is entailed by themuch less controversial
thesis of semantic deflationism.Thismeans thatThomasson needs to be careful
(and indeed she is) when relying on premises she defends in other places, i.e.,
premises that form part of her easy approach to ontology. Easy ontology,
being a particular instance of meta-ontological deflationism, obviously entails
meta-ontological deflationism all by itself. Thus relying on it would bereave
the argument of the punch it is supposed to have.
III. FROM SEMANTIC DEFLATIONISM TO EXISTENCE
DEFLATIONISM
III.1. The argument from truth deflationism
Thomasson’s argument from truth deflationism to existence deflationism pro-
ceeds as follows. First, Thomasson notes that given some simple truth claim,
i.e., that 〈F(t)〉 is true, we can derive the claim that t exists and that Fs exist,
given only the equivalence schema for truth plus some standards assumptions
about how to regiment discourse in a formal language. More precisely, from
the claim that 〈F(t)〉 is true we can infer that t is F, and from that we may infer
∃x (x = t) and ∃x Fx, and that in turn implies that t exists and that Fs exist.
Thomasson then continues as follows:
Since we can always derive existence claims (singular and general) from truth claims,
there is some substantive across-the-board criterion for existence only if the same is
available for truth. But if (as the deflationist holds) there is no general substantive
condition required for a proposition to be true, then we may derive different existence
claims from the truth of diverse propositions – without any common condition holding,
and sowithout any single substantive criterion for existence being fulfilled across all cases.
So, since the deflationist about truth denies that there is any across-the-board condition
for a proposition to be true, she is also led to deny that there is any across-the-board
criterion for existence. The truth deflationist should thus also embrace deflationism
about existence. [...] So if we have a true proposition such as 〈the table is brown〉 we can
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move from there to infer that tables (and brown things) exist; from 〈five is odd〉 we can
infer that the number five (and an odd thing) exists. (Thomasson 2014: 195f)
One can extract two distinct arguments from truth deflationism to existence
deflationism from this quote. The first argument is this:
There is some substantive across-the-board criterion for existence only if the same is
available for truth. Since deflationists deny that there is a substantive across-the-board
criterion for truth, they have to deny that there is one for existence as well.
The second argument runs as follows:
Deflationists about truth deny that there is a substantive across-the-board criterion for
truth. Since we can infer diverse existence claims from diverse truths, there cannot be
a substantive across-the-board criterion for existence. For example, since there is no
across-the-board criterion for the truth of 〈the table is brown〉 and 〈five is odd〉, there is
no across-the-board criterion for the existence of tables and the number five either.
We will deal with both arguments in turn.
III.1.1. First argument: logical entailment
The crucial claim of Thomasson’s first argument is that there is a substantive
across-the-board criterion for existence only if the same is available for truth.
In other words, she claims that the following conditional holds:
If (1) there is a substantive criterion for existence, then (2) there is a substantive criterion
for truth.
Given the implication from (1) to (2), Thomasson’s conclusion follows imme-
diately: since the semantic deflationist rejects (2), she must also reject (1)—that
is, a deflationist about truth has to endorse deflationism about existence as
well. The question therefore is: does the implication from (1) to (2) hold?
Assume there is a substantive across-the-board criterion for existence φ(x)
such that x exists if and only if φ(x). Does it follow that there is a substantive
across-the-board criterion for truth? Instead of looking at arbitrary sentences,
let’s focus on atomic sentences. For if there is no substantive across-the-board
criterion for atomic sentences, there won’t be one for all sentences either. So
let’s consider a true atomic statement of the form F(t). The truth of such a
predication involves two aspects. Given the assumption that there is a substan-
tive criterion of existence φ(x), the truth of F(t) requires, firstly, that t satisfy φ(x).
This will be a necessary condition for the truth of F(t), but it isn’t a sufficient
one. We have: 〈F(t)〉 is true→φ(t), but the other direction doesn’t hold. For the
truth of F(t) requires, secondly, that t satisfy the predicate ‘F’.
In order for there to be a substantive across-the-board criterion of truth
there needs to be a substantive binary relation ψ(x, y) such that for all objects
x and all (atomic) predicates y, x satisfies y if and only if ψ(x, y). But the mere
assumption that all objects x satisfy some common criterion of existence φ(x)
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does not entail that there is a substantive relation ψ(x, y) between objects and
predicates. After all, ‘x exists’ is a unary predicate, whereas ‘x satisfies y’ is a
binary predicate. A substantive criterion of existence will place a restriction on
what values the variable ‘x’ in ‘x satisfies y’ can take; it can also place a restriction
on what values ‘y’ can take. But this doesn’t tell us what pairs x, y stand in the
satisfaction relation. In other words, we may have: x satisfies y → φ(x) ∧ φ(y).
But clearly, we do not have: φ(x) ∧ φ(y) → x satisfies y, because this would
entail that every object satisfies every predicate whatsoever. What is needed
is a further formula χ(x, y) such that φ(x) ∧ φ(y) ∧ χ(x, y) → x satisfies y. And
the semantic deflationist can either deny that there is an appropriate formula
χ(x, y) or, assuming there is one, deny that it expresses a substantive relation. For
example, the semantic deflationist may admit that such a formula χ(x, y) exists
for purely mathematical reasons. For instance, it is well-known that if the use
of infinite disjunctions is accepted, one can simply define ‘x satisfies y’ as (y =
〈F1〉 ∧ F1(x)) ∨ (y = 〈F2〉 ∧ F2(x)) ∨ . . . But surely, this does not show that the
satisfaction relation is ‘substantive’ in the way a semantic inflationist takes it to
be.
Indeed, when it comes to the relation between objects and predicates, the
semantic deflationist will simply endorse all instances of the schema
t satisfies 〈F 〉 if and only if F (t),
(which is not a definition of ‘x satisfies y’)5 and deny that there is a more
informative and uniform story to tell about why an object satisfies a predicate.
Thus, even if there is a substantive criterion of existence, this merely places
a restriction on what singular terms can appear in true predications—viz.
those terms that pick out an object satisfying the existence criterion. But it
does not in any way restrict the kinds of claims we can make about those
objects (descriptive, aesthetic, moral, etc.) and it doesn’t entail that there is a
substantive across-the-board criterion for the truth of such claims.6
5 It may be an ‘implicit definition’ in the sense of Hilbert, i.e., a set of axioms constraining
the interpretation of ‘x satisfies y’. But it is not a definition in the usual textbook-of-logic sense,
i.e., something having the form ‘x satisfies y ↔ ψ(x, y)’.
6 Perhaps it will be objected that it is enough for Thomasson’s argument to go through that
there is a substantial across-the-board criterion for all existential sentences. For surely, if there is
a substantive criterion for existence φ(x), a statement of the form ∃x (x = t) is true if and only
if φ(t). Thus, a substantial criterion for existence implies a substantial criterion for the truth of
existence claims. That much is uncontroversial, and a deflationist about truth who endorses a
substantive criterion of existence will not deny that. But this doesn’t mean that such a deflationist
has adopted an incoherent or inconsistent position. Deflationism about truth is not a local thesis
about declarative sentences of a particular form (i.e., existence claims), it is a thesis about all
truth-apt sentences. The deflationist can very well admit that there is a substantive criterion of
truth for some truth-apt sentences while denying that there is one for all truth-apt sentences—and
indeed, Thomasson herself entertains the possibility that there might be substantial criteria for
certain kinds of statements, for instance those that are part of science (Thomasson 2014: 202–24).
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III.1.2. Second argument: compatibility
The general idea behind Thomasson’s second argument is this: once we take a
broad range of truths into account—truths such as ‘the table is brown’ and ‘five
is odd’—it becomes unviable to accept truth deflationism without existence
deflationism. For truths about tables and numbers entail the existence of tables
and numbers, and it is hard to see which substantial criterion for existence
might account both for the existence of tables and numbers.
The first thing to note is that the existence of different kinds of things doesn’t
really rule out the possibility of a substantive across-the-board criterion for
existence. Maybe the substantial criterion these things share is that they are all
created by God, or that they are mind-independent. Moreover, it may also be
the case that all existing things share some disjunctive existence property, such
as being a concrete or an abstract object. But for the sake of the argument, we are
willing to grant that numbers and tables don’t share a non-disjunctive criterion
of existence, and that the sharing of a disjunctive criterion of existence doesn’t
qualify as a substantive criterion.
The second thing to note is that the argument relies on some additional
premises—namely, that various claims such as ‘the table is brown’ and ‘five
is odd’ are true. Clearly, these premises are logically independent of truth
deflationism. As mentioned before, we therefore assume that at this stage
Thomasson wants to argue for something weaker than logical entailment:
truth deflationism leads to existence deflationism given only some additional
premises that a truth deflationist has little reason to deny.
Let us therefore have a closer look at these additional premises. They will
seem unproblematic to many, but remember the dialectical situation: among
the ontologists Thomasson is up against, doubting that such statements are
true is commonplace precisely because they are taken to imply the existence of
tables and numbers (see for instance Merricks 2001; Field 1980). Mereological
nihilists reject the existence of tables, and nominalists reject the existence of
numbers, however. In this context, assuming that statements about tables and
numbers are true thus begs the question.
In other work, Thomasson has of course argued that we should disregard
such revisionary ontologists and accept ‘the table is brown’ and ‘five is odd’ as
straightforwardly true (Thomasson 2007, 2015). But as we pointed out earlier,
Thomasson cannot just rely on these results at this point, since then the
argument becomes uninteresting by relying on the position it was designed to
support. Instead Thomasson should offer an independent argument why truth
deflationists ought to accept these additional premises. This is exactly what
she is attempting to do:
[...] the only way to doubt the existence claim is if one also doubts the truth of the original
propositions (<the table is brown> or<five is odd>). The original propositions certainly
seem true, however. It seems that doubts about their truth are only raised (except by
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the mathematically or perceptually incompetent) for metaphysical reasons: doubts, for
example, about what the truthmakers for the relevant claims could be or whether we
should countenance the alleged truthmakers [...]. But those worries are out of place if
we accept a deflationary theory of truth, which rejects across-the-board demands such
as the requirement that truths have truthmakers. (Thomasson 2014: 196f)
According to Thomasson, the only way for a truth deflationist to reject
existence deflationism is to deny the truth of propositions such as <the table
is brown> and <five is odd>. But this can only be done for metaphysical
reasons, and these fall away once we reject an inflationary account of truth.
The last step is too fast, however. It is of course true that the alleged truths
about tables or numbers are usually only denied for metaphysical reasons.
It is not true, however, that such reasons always presuppose an inflationary
conception of truth. For example, consider a philosopher who rejects the
existence of composite objects because she fears that accepting them into
her ontology will lead to causal overdetermination (Thomasson 2007: 15ff). If,
for instance, there are stones in addition to particles arranged stone-wise, it
might seem that the shattering of a window would be caused by the window
being hit by a stone and by it being hit by particles arranged stone-wise.7
Assuming that widespread causal overdetermination is to be avoided, these
considerations provide a reason to reject composites, and hence to deny that
statements referring to stones (or tables) are true. We are not saying that this
is a good reason to deny that there are composite objects. But it is a reason
that has been taken seriously by philosophers, and, importantly, one which is
compatible with truth deflationism, since it relies on the wish to avoid causal
overdetermination, not on some uniform criterion of truth. It is therefore not
the case that truth deflationists have to accept that there are true statements
referring to stones (or tables).8
Truth deflationism entails that there is no general criterion of truth, but
that doesn’t imply that there can be no disagreement about whether particular
statements are true or not, what speaks in favour or against their truth, etc.
Philosophy is full of arguments against taking statements that seem true to be
true (or even truth-apt), and if Thomasson really thinks that these can all be
answered merely by adopting truth deflationism this would need to be argued
for in more detail.
7 One way to respond to this worry would be to deny that the stone is a distinct object
from the particles, by accepting the view that composition is identity (Cotnoir 2014). Thomasson
herself accepts the more standard view that composites are distinct from their parts however
(Thomasson 2007: chapter 4).
8 Here are two further examples. First, one may deny the existence of certain objects as the
result of an application of Ockham’s razor. For instance, one may eschew numbers in favour of
sets. Second, one may disavow the existence of certain objects (e.g. events, clouds, and properties)
because they lack a criterion of identity. None of these reasons seem to rely specifically on an
inflationary conception of truth.
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We therefore see no reason to think that a truth deflationist has to accept that
statements like ‘the table is brown’ and ‘five is odd’ are true. Since Thomasson
needs these additional premises, her second argument that truth deflationism
entails existence deflationism seems to fail as well.
III.2. The argument from reference deflationism
We have seen that while there is indeed a conceptual link between truth
and existence, in so far as we can derive existence claims from truth claims,
this connection doesn’t suffice to establish Thomasson’s conclusion: it doesn’t
imply that there is a substantive across-the-board criterion for existence only
if there is one for truth. In this section, we will consider whether existence
deflationism can instead be derived from the conceptual link between the
notions of existence and reference, which according to Thomasson is even ‘more
fundamental’ (2014) than the one between existence and truth.
According to the semantic deflationist, there is no substantive relation R
such that y refers to x if and only if R(y, x). Rather, the notion of reference is
captured by the following trivial schema:
∀x (〈n〉 refers to x iff n = x)
This schema, it should be noted, doesn’t amount to a definition of the
relation ‘y refers to x’ (cf. footnote 5). For example, the schema doesn’t tell us
how to eliminate an occurrence of ‘y refers to x’ in a given statement.
Now, says Thomasson, ‘we may define the monadic notion of being a
referring concept’ as follows:9
〈n〉 refers iff ∃z (z = n)
Given the interdefinability of the existential quantifier and ‘existence’, we
therefore get:
E: 〈n〉 refers iff n exists. (Thomasson 2014: 198)
Thomasson takes this conceptual connection (together with the earlier con-
nection between truth and existence) to have substantial implications:
[...] on this view the concepts of truth, reference, truth-of, and existence are all interlinked
by trivial rules, and deflationisms about any of these notions stand or fall together.
(Thomasson 2014: 198)
Why exactly do deflationism about reference and deflationism about exis-
tence ‘stand or fall together’? Unfortunately, Thomasson is not very explicit
on this point. It seems likely that the argument she has in mind is analogous
9 Note again that this is not a definition in the textbook-of-logic sense. A definition must have
the form ‘y refers iff ...y...’
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to the previous one regarding truth and existence: since (E) shows us how to
‘define’ reference in terms of existence, there is a substantive across-the-board
criterion for existence only if there is one for reference as well. Since there is
no criterion for reference, according to semantic deflationism, there is none
for existence either. Hence deflationism about reference entails deflationism
about existence.
Whatever the argument is supposed to be, it is hard to see why a reference
deflationist needs to be an existence deflationist as well. Reference deflationism
is a claim about the binary relation ‘y refers to x’—it denies that there is
a substantive across-the-board criterion for this relation. Now even if there is
a substantive criterion of existence φ(x), this in no way implies that there is a
substantive relation R(y, x) between singular terms and objects. Analogously
to the case of truth, we do get the following entailment: 〈n〉refers → φ(n).
However, nothing follows about whether a substantive relation R(y, x) holds
between 〈n〉 and n, just as a substantive criterion of existence doesn’t imply that
there is a substantive relation ψ(x, y) between objects and predicates. Again,
this is so for the very simple reason that ‘x exists’ is a unary predicate whereas
‘y refers to x’ is a binary predicate. This means that existence deflationism is
logically independent of reference deflationism, and therefore one can be a
reference deflationist with or without being an existence deflationist.
III.3. A general remark
Ultimately, the failure of the arguments from semantic deflationism to existence
deflationism should not come as a big surprise. As we mentioned earlier,
according to deflationists like Horwich the truth predicate is merely a device
of generalisation, enabling us to express things such as ‘Everything that Jamie
says about food is true’ or ‘Everything Einstein said about relativity is true’. In
order for the truth predicate to serve this purpose, it is sufficient and necessary
for it to be governed by the trivial equivalence schema—no further analysis
of the notion of truth is required. And it is clear that the truth predicate has
its rightful place in our language even if we merely countenance a particular
domain of discourse—say, spatiotemporal objects. In other words: even if all
the things we ever talked about were of the same kind, and shared a common
criterion for their existence, it would still be useful to have a truth predicate
governed by the trivial equivalence schema at hand. The same holds for
the notion of reference, since it is desirable to be able to express the de re-
attributionsHorwich uses tomotivate reference deflationism regardless of one’s
ontological persuasions. Given this, the compatibility of semantic deflationism
with different views about the nature of existence is just what one would expect.
We have argued that there is no entailment from semantic deflation-
ism about truth and reference to existence deflationism. The second step
of Thomasson’s argument—the argument from existence deflationism to
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/pq/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/pq/pqaa019/5848681 by guest on 13 June 2020
14 BENJAMIN MARSCHALL AND THOMAS SCHINDLER
meta-ontological deflationism—is still worth looking at though. Since on the
face of it existence deflationism looks compatible with all kinds of views in
meta-ontology, it would be an interesting result if, as Thomasson claims, it
really entails meta-ontological deflationism.
IV. FROM EXISTENCE DEFLATIONISM TO
META-ONTOLOGICAL DEFLATIONISM
IV.1. Logical entailment
Let us recall the main tenets of meta-ontological deflationism:
Meta-Ontological Deflationism
When we answer ontological questions we should ...
(a) ... not invoke the nature of existence.
(b) ... not use a neo-Quinean methodology.
For existence deflationism to entail meta-ontological deflationism, Thomas-
son needs to show that it entails both (a) and (b). We will first argue that exis-
tence deflationism doesn’t logically entail meta-ontological deflationism. After
that, we will look at Thomasson’s own argument, which involves an additional
premise.
According to existence deflationism, existence has no deep nature. It is then
clear that it makes no sense to invoke the nature of existence in ontological
debates, since there is no such thing. Accepting existence deflationism without
also accepting (a) doesn’t seem to be a coherent position, so this part of
Thomasson’s argument is successful.
We do not think that existence deflationism entails (b), however. Remember
that according to the neo-Quinean methodology, we determine what exists
by looking at the ontological commitments of the best overall theory of the
world, instead of closely following natural language. How could the claim
that existence has no deep nature possibly entail that one must reject this
methodology? As far as we can see there is only one possibility: if the neo-
Quineanmethodology implied that there is a substantive criterion of existence,
then (b) would entail (a), and the above argument applies.
It is notable that if one follows the neo-Quinean approach, then everything
that exists will have some properties in common. A trivial example is that
every object has the property of being a value of a variable in the best overall
theory. Another example is that everything that exists is self-identical. More
interestingly, the criteria of theory choice neo-Quineans endorsewill lead to the
result that every entity quantified over in our best theory does some explanatory
work, for explanatory danglers would be excluded as unparsimonious.
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In light of this it is tempting to suspect that the neo-Quinean methodology
commits us to a substantial criterion after all, according which to exist is to
play an explanatory role.10 This temptation must be resisted, however. The
argument seems to rely on the following kind of inference, which is clearly
invalid:
All existing things are F, therefore to exist is to be F.
On a related point, Nathan Salmon argues that being the value of a variable
provides no analysis of existence:
[I]t cannot be seriously maintained that being, in the sense of ‘existence’, simply is the
state or condition of being the value of a variable, under some assignment of values to variables. [...]
If there were no variables, would there be nothing? The dinosaurs had existence, but
they didn’t have variables. Perhaps there were no variables at the time of the dinosaurs
for them to be the values of. To be sure, the geometric shapes and patterns that form
the lower case italic ‘x’, ‘y’, and ‘z’ existed even then, but were they variables, and were
functions from them to objects assignments of values to variables? (Salmon 1987: 51)
Similarly, it would seem that playing an explanatory role cannot be con-
sidered as a substantial criterion of existence. For surely an object could have
existed even if there never were any theories, and therefore it could have existed
without playing an explanatory role.
The claim that playing an explanatory role shouldn’t be considered a sub-
stantive criterion of existence can also be supported by reflecting on the nature
of the neo-Quinean methodology more generally. Neo-Quineans think that
developing theories which exhibit theoretical virtues is truth-conducive, and
guides us towards the true ontology. Consequently, they must presuppose that
the world is actually simple, for otherwise there is no reason to think that sim-
pler theories are more likely to be true than complex ones. But neo-Quineans
are also realists who hold that the world and our theories about the world
are in principle independent. There is therefore the possibility of a mismatch:
although the theoretical virtue of simplicity makes us prefer theories without
explanatory danglers, if we are unlucky the world might nevertheless contain
objects which play no explanatory role.11 The neo-Quineans should therefore
not claim that everything that exists is by its nature explanatory.
Neo-Quineanism is a thesis about the epistemology of metaphysics—it gives us
a method of finding out what exists. Existence deflationism, on the other hand,
is a (negative) claim about the property of existence, and hence a metaphysical
thesis. As realists, neo-Quineans will refuse to infer metaphysical conclusions
10 We thank an anonymous referee for pressing this objection.
11 Indeed, such scenarios are discussed by Lewis. Although he relies on the virtue of simplicity
himself, he accepts that there are many possible worlds in which this methodology is not truth-
conducive. A modal realist thus needs to rebut skeptical worries (see Lewis 1986: section 2.5).
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from epistemological premises. We conclude that existence deflationism does
not logically entail meta-ontological deflationism.
IV.2. Compatibility
Thomasson seems to agree with our assessment, since she presents her ar-
gument against the neo-Quinean methodology as distinct from the argument
against deep natures. After presenting her argument for existence deflationism,
she writes the following:
Moreover, we should even reject the dominant neo-Quinean approach to existence ques-
tions: that we should accept the existence only of those entities ineliminably quantified
over in our best scientific theories. For some concepts, for example 〈hat〉, apparently
refer regardless of whether or not we quantify over hats in our best scientific theories.
(Thomasson 2014: 202)
As we understand it, this argument is quite straightforward and resembles
the second argument from truth deflationism to existence deflationism:
1. <hat> refers.
2. Therefore: hats exist.
3. The truth (2) obtains whether or not hats are quantified over in our best
scientific theories.
4. According to neo-Quineanism, only those things that are quantified over by
our best scientific theories exist.
5. So: Neo-Quineanism is wrong.
Clearly, premise (1) is logically independent from existence deflationism, so
the crucial question is whether an existence deflationist has to accept premise
(1) (or (2)). If not, then Thomasson has not shown that existence deflationism
leads to meta-ontological deflationism.
Earlier we already discussed whether a truth deflationist is forced to admit
that ‘the table is brown’ is true, and similar lessons apply here. Of course for
an existence deflationist some reasons to deny the truth of certain existence
statements fall away, namely, all those considerations that invoke an alleged
nature of existence. But, analogous to what we pointed out in the discussion of
truth deflationism, claiming that all reasons to deny the truth of statements that
seem true fall away once existence deflationism is accepted is a much stronger
claim that is not supported by Thomasson’s arguments.
To return to our earlier example, consider a neo-Quinean who rejects the
existence of composite objects because she fears that accepting them into her
ontology will lead to causal overdetermination. Whatever the merits of this
argument are, it is one that is arguably compatible with existence deflationism,
since it relies on the wish to avoid causal overdetermination, which is not
obviously related to a uniform criterion of existence. If Thomasson’s thought
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is that, despite initial appearances, all such metaphysical reasons ultimately
rely on a substantial criterion of existence, this claim needs to be argued for in
detail. As it stands we thus see no reason to think that existence deflationists
have to accept that there are true statements referring to stones (or hats).
Once again, the argument would lose much of its interest if Thomasson
relied on her arguments for the existence of hats she gives elsewhere. In the
current dialectical situation, the question is whether existence deflationism on
its own suffices to entail meta-ontological deflationism. If the argument only
worked if we accept that there are hats based on Thomasson’s easy approach
to ontology this would rob the argument of its force, as pointed out earlier.
In response onemight argue that the neo-Quinean strategy is unconvincing,
since we have much better evidence for the existence of hats—and hence the
truth of premise (2)—than we have for the fruitfulness of the neo-Quinean
methodology.12 Philosophical motivations such as the wish to avoid causal
overdetermination, so the thought goes, could never carry enough weight
to deny Moorean facts such as that there are hats. We think that this is
an interesting strategy to undermine the neo-Quinean methodology, which
deserves to be taken seriously.13 It is important to note that even if it succeeds,
however, the objection is unrelated to the deflationisms which are the focus
of this paper, since it challenges the epistemological merits of neo-Quineanism.
This Moorean move is thus not really a defence of Thomasson’s entailment
claim, but rather an independent argument.
In a way the result of this section is unsurprising. Just as truth deflationism
is compatible with various opinions on which sentences are true, existence
deflationism, being a view about the nature of existence, is compatible with
various views onwhat particular things exist.Of course an existence deflationist
may accept more things than are quantified over by our best scientific theories,
and hence reject neo-Quineanism—but if so, this will be for independent
reasons which are not directly related to existence deflationism.
V. DEFLATIONISM AND EASY ONTOLOGY
We have argued that Thomasson’s argument for the interesting part of meta-
ontological deflationism—namely, that the popular neo-Quinean approach to
ontology is mistaken—fails. Thomasson gives a second argument, however,
according to which existence deflationism combined with a use theory of
meaning leads to a specific version of meta-ontological deflationism, namely,
her easy approach to ontology. The core of this view is the following:
Easy Ontology
Ontological questions can be answered easily using empirical or conceptual means.
12 Thanks for an anonymous referee for pressing this objection.
13 For discussion see Paul 2016.
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We will conclude our paper by criticising this last argument.
According to Thomasson, we can derive easy ontology from existence
deflationism if we accept a ‘particular form’ of use theory, which makes certain
‘plausible assumptions’ about what the rules of use are (Thomasson 2014: 205).
This time our objection will not be that this entailment fails to hold, but
rather that Thomasson’s way of presenting the argument is misleading, since
it suggests that existence deflationism plays an essential role. Against this
impression we will argue that in fact easy ontology can be derived from the
kind of use theory Thomasson proposes on its own, and that it is therefore
unhelpful to frame the relationship between existence deflationism and easy
ontology in the way she does.
As described earlier, Thomasson regards the following as a conceptual truth:
(T) If there are particles arranged table-wise then there is a table.
This leads to an easy approach to ontology, since the existence of particles
arranged table-wise can be regarded as an uncontroversial empirical truth,
and together with (T) it entails that there are tables. This case is supposed to
generalise. Like the neo-Fregeans, Thomasson also argues for the existence of
numbers based on the analyticity of Hume’s Principle:
(HP) The number of Fs = The number of Gs iff There are as many
Fs as Gs.
Use theories ofmeaning become relevant in justifying the claim that principles
such as (T) and (HP) are indeed conceptual truths. Thomasson’s thought is
that these principles express a regularity or norm which is constitutive for the
meaning of the relevant terms:
On a use theory of meaning, the meaning of a term is said to be constituted by its
basic use-regularity that explains the acceptance of sentences containing the word (on
naturalistic versions [...]) or (on normativist versions) by rules or norms governing its
use. (Thomasson 2014: 190)
We agree that postulating the existence of analytic principles governing the
meaning of expressions is plausible for use theorists. However, the exact form
these principles can take has been controversial, as we will now illustrate by
looking at the case of numbers and Hume’s Principle.
It has repeatedly been argued that (HP) cannot possibly be analytic—at
least on traditional accounts of analyticity—because it implies the existence
of infinitely many objects (Field 1989; Boolos 1998; Horwich 1998; chapter 6,
see also Bennett 2009: 56). This leads to the suggestion that if there is a rule
capturing the meaning of ‘number’, it needs to have this form:
(HP*) If there are numbers, then: The number of Fs = The number of Gs
iff There are as many Fs as Gs.
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And (HP*) doesn’t lead to easy ontology, since nothing interesting can be
derived from it unless one has established that there are numbers in the first
place, which is the kind of substantial metaphysical question an easy ontologist
wants to avoid.
Given this, it makes sense to distinguish between a strong and a weak use
theory of meaning:
Strong Use Theory
The rules that capture the use of terms look like (HP).
Weak Use Theory
The rules that capture the use of terms look like (HP*).
It is clear that only a strong use theory can support easy ontology, and
we take it that Thomasson would agree with this. Our complaint is now
as follows: according to Thomasson it is a strong use theory combined with
existence deflationism that entails easy ontology. But this is a misleading way
of putting things, since existence deflationism really does no work in deriving
the existence of entities in an easy manner at all. For example, once the strong
use theory has given us (HP), we can derive the existence of numbers by logic
alone.14 Contra Thomasson’s presentation, it is thus much more perspicuous
to say that easy ontology follows from a strong use theory on its own.
One might object that we are being uncharitable here, since what Thomas-
son plausibly has in mind is the following: Since there are weak and strong use
theories, we need to support the strong version in order to make ontology easy.
Existence deflationism supports a strong use theory. Hence there is a sense in
which existence deflationism and a use theory jointly entail easy ontology.
We agree that this would be a good argument, but think that the crucial
premise is false. It is not the case that an existence deflationist has to be a
strong use theorist. Existence deflationism is a negative thesis: there is no sub-
stantive across-the-board-criterion of existence. But surely this negative claim
provides no positive reason for thinking that some analytic claims are existence-
entailing. It provides no positive reason for thinking that numbers exist and
that their existence can be established through conceptual means alone. The
thesis of existence deflationism is clearly compatible with the traditional view
of analyticity.15
Our conclusion is thus that Thomasson overplays the importance of exis-
tence deflationism in her argument for easy ontology. This is not to say that
14 To be sure, this argument presupposes Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, but
that is an assumption that is shared by both parties, i.e., neo-Quineans and (most) meta-
ontological deflationists (Thomasson surely accepts it). That is, the inference does not presuppose
a deflationary account of existence.
15 For a criticism of Thomasson’s own defence of the analyticity of existence-entailing princi-
ples see Marschall 2019.
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existence deflationism, as well as semantic deflationism, are of no help whatso-
ever in defending a strong use theory. As briefly discussed earlier, Thomasson
has shown that certain arguments against easy ontology rely on substantial
views about reference that are incompatible with reference deflationism. These
are matters that require detailed case-by-case investigations, however, and we
think that Thomasson’s entailment-claim is unhelpful because it makes the
situation appear more straightforward than it actually is.
VI. CONCLUSION
Does semantic deflationism entail meta-ontological deflationism? We have ar-
gued that the answer is no. Deflationism about truth doesn’t entail existence
deflationism because all thingsmight share a criterion of existence even though
there is no substantive relation between predicates and objects, and hence no
substantive relation between true sentences and worldly entities. Deflation-
ism about reference doesn’t entail existence deflationism either because all
things might share a criterion of existence even though there is no substantive
reference-relation between singular terms and objects. Furthermore, existence
deflationism on its own is compatible with a neo-Quinean methodology, and
hence doesn’t entail meta-ontological deflationism. Finally, while easy ontol-
ogy indeed follows from a strong use theory, the acceptance of the latter is not
entailed by existence deflationism.
It is important to note that we only targeted claims about entailment. We are
not saying that either of the views discussed are mistaken. We are also not
saying that they don’t make an attractive package, and that it is hence a good
idea to combine them in the way Thomasson proposes. Quite the opposite,
as already suggested in Section II.3, it looks as if semantic deflationism indeed
allows one to defuse a common objection to easy ontology—which is in itself
an interesting result. We hope that our clarification is a useful addition to the
literature, from which both friends and enemies of deflationism will benefit.
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